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Jawing through Crises: Chinese and Vietnamese Media
Strategies in the South China Sea
Frances Yaping Wang and Brantly Womack
University of Notre Dame, USA; University of Virginia, USA
ABSTRACT
Winston Churchill once said, ‘it is better to jaw-jaw than to war-war.’
However, negotiations are particularly diﬃcult when they are enmeshed
in public opinion precommitments. The sharpest crisis between China
and Vietnam in the last 30 years concerned the placement of a Chinese
oil rig into contested waters in 2014. This study analyses the Chinese and
Vietnamese propaganda eﬀorts surrounding the crisis as examples of the
instrumental use of propaganda in managing domestic public opinion
on diplomatic crises. The article argues that despite very diﬀerent
approaches to public diplomacy during the crisis, both states were
primarily concerned with avoiding escalation and ending the confronta-
tion. The authors show how propaganda function as a pacifying device
in dealing with rising domestic nationalism when executing a moderate
foreign policy.
The Sino-Vietnameseoil rig crisis startedon2May2014when the state-ownedChinaNationalOﬀshoreOil
Corporation (CNOOC) moved its Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig, a semisubmersible drilling platform built in
2012 at a cost of US$ one billion, to a location of maritime dispute between the two countries without
prior consultation with Vietnam. The oil rig location, although changed slightly several times throughout
the crisis, was about 17 nautical miles South of the Paracel Islands claimed by both countries but currently
occupied by China. The location is 130 nautical miles oﬀ the Vietnamese coast and 180 nautical miles oﬀ
China’s Hainan Island, so if the Paracel claims are ignored, it lies on the Vietnam side of the equidistance
line between the coast of Vietnam and Hainan, and within the two countries’ overlapping Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZ).1 China’s placement of the oil rig in this location triggered dangerous actions by
both sides at sea in the vicinity of the rig such as ramming vessels, ﬁring water cannons, and large-scale
deadly riots in Vietnam burning down foreign-owned factories.2
The oil rig crisis was the most serious and sustained confrontation between China and Vietnam since
the conclusion of the 12 years of active hostility from 1979 to 1991. It marked the high point of tension in
the relationship and attracted global attention. In 2011, the RAND Corporation completed a study of the
possible venues for armed conﬂict between the United States and China over a 20-year period.3 They
CONTACT Frances Yaping Wang fwang@virginia.edu
1People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs (MoFA), ‘The Operation of the HYSY 981 Drilling Rig: Vietnam’s
Provocation and China’s Position’, (8 June 2014), available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1163264.
shtml (accessed 28 December 2018); Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs (MoFA), ‘Remarks by FM
Spokesman Le Hai Binh on 4 May 2014’, (4 May 2014), available at: http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/
ns140505232230 (accessed 28 December 2018).
2Kate Hodal and Jonathan Kaiman, ‘At Least 21 Dead in Vietnam Anti-China protests over oil rig’, The Guardian, (15 May 2014),
available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/15/vietnam-anti-china-protests-oil-rig-dead-injured (accessed 28
December 2018).
3James Dobbins, David C. Gompert, David A. Shlapak, and Andrew Scobell, Conﬂict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and
Strategies for Deterrence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, OP-344-A, 2011).
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concluded that in the order of likelihood, conﬂict could arise in KoreanPeninsula, Taiwan, Japan, the South
China Sea, cyberspace, or India. In 2017, RAND revisited the topic.4 RAND now considers the South China
Sea themost likely venue for conﬂict after Korea: ‘What is clear. . .is that this body of water has become the
unanticipated focal point of US-Chinese geostrategic rivalry.’5 The 2014 oil rig crisis leads the list of reasons
for heightened US concern. Although war is still considered unlikely, RAND is now less conﬁdent that war
will not occur.
There are a number of links in the chain of reasoning from the temporary placement of an oil rig in
disputed waters and an increased possibility of major war. The ﬁrst and most solid link is between the oil
rig crisis and the general conﬂict of claims in the SouthChina SeabetweenChina and the littoral Southeast
Asian states. Although the Paracel dispute is only bilateral, the claims made by both sides are similar to
those made in the more generally contested areas further south. Location makes the South China Sea
important. It is the hollow center of maritime Southeast Asia, and China’s presence has been seen as
intrusive, especially since 2008.6 A second link is the willingness of regional states to risk war. The
magnitude and drama of the oil rig crisis apparently gives credence to willingness to escalate. However,
this article will argue that in fact the media behavior of both China and Vietnam showed willingness to
moderate and dampen the confrontation. A third link is between regional conﬂict and US interests. This is
theweakest link, since the professedUS concern is freedomof navigation andChinawould be themost at
risk if there were disruption in transiting the South China Sea. Although American attention is focused on
China’s refusal to consider military ships eligible for ‘innocent passage’ through its Exclusive Economic
Zone,manyother states share China’s stand includingVietnam,Malaysia, Indonesia, India, andTaiwan.7 As
to normal maritime commerce, the RAND report notes, ‘closure of the South China Sea to commercial
traﬃcwouldmost heavily aﬀect China because theUnited States’ regional allies have alternate sea lines of
communication out to the Paciﬁc.’8 The current and prospective rivalry between the United States and
China is one of asymmetric parity, and the strategic interest of Southeast Asia is to insulate itself from
global polarization.9
Against this backdrop, the article analyzes the behavior of the Vietnamese and Chinese leadership
during the oil rig crisis as they interacted with public opinion through their control of the oﬃcial media.
The contrast between the Vietnamese and Chinese oﬃcial media behavior in the crisis is both interesting
and puzzling. Beijing issued speciﬁc guidelines to keep the media from ‘hyping’ the dispute. A total of 36
People’s Daily articles were published during the 74 days of the crisis, with none appearing in the front
page andmost copying the ForeignMinistry’s statements. Even after the riots occurred in Vietnam, Beijing
ostensibly delayed in reporting the violent events and disciplined the commercial media in following suit.
In contrast, Nhan Dan (The People), the Vietnamese equivalent of China’s People’s Daily, published 224
articles on the dispute, averaging three articles a day. Hanoi did not shy away from using every
opportunity to make its point. Even an article on the beauty pageant reads that contestants ‘call[ed] for
actions to support Vietnam Government to defend its sovereignty in the East Sea and asking China to
immediately withdraw its illegal Haiyang Shiyou-981 oil rig and ships oﬀ Vietnam’s waters.’10 Thanh Nien
News (Youth News), one of the ﬁve most inﬂuential newspapers in Vietnam, published 570 articles on the
subject, averaging at eight articles a day.11
4James Dobbins, Andrew Scobell, Edmund J. Burke, David C. Gompert, Derek Grossman, Eric Heginbotham, Howard J. Shatz,
Conﬂict with China Revisited: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, PE-
248-A, 2017), available at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE248.html (accessed 28 December 2018).
5Ibid., p. 4.
6Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘How new and assertive is china’s new assertiveness?’, International Security 37(4), (2013), pp. 7–48;
Brantly Womack, ‘China and the future status quo’, Chinese Journal of International Politics 8(2), (2015), pp. 115–137.
7U.S. Department of Defense Freedom of Navigation Report for Fiscal Year 2016, available at: http://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-
Oﬃces/FON/ (accessed 28 December 2018).
8Dobbins et al., Conﬂict with China Revisited, p. 5.
9Brantly Womack, ‘Asymmetric parity: U.S.-China relations in a multinodal world’, International Aﬀairs 92(6), (2016), pp. 1463–1480.
10‘Dang Thu Thao crowned Miss Vietnam Oceans 2014‘, Nhan Dan, (26 May 2014), available at: http://en.nhandan.com.vn/
culture/lifestyle/item/2536502-dang-thu-thao-crowned-miss-vietnam-oceans-2014.html (accessed 10 May 2018).
11Nhung T. Bui, ‘Managing anti-China nationalism in Vietnam: evidence from the media during the 2014 oil rig crisis’, The
Paciﬁc Review 30(2), (2017), p. 169.
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To explain this stark diﬀerence between the two countries’media behaviors, the authors apply amore
general theory of media instrumentality developed by Wang, demonstrating that even though the two
sides took quite diﬀerent approaches to media control, they shared the goal of trying to arrive at a face-
saving end to the confrontation. This theory demonstrates that state media strategies are a result of
existing public opinion and the state’s foreign policy intention. A state could use a propaganda campaign
counterintuitively to placate an existing strong public opinion in order to meet with its moderate policy
intent. This article shows how a state, in this case Vietnam, achieves that. On the ﬂip side, the state keeps
quiet on a dispute if the public opinion and the state policy intent are aligned. The Chinese side of the
story illustrates this other scenario. Thus, the divergentmedia behaviors in these two countries are really a
result of working with diﬀerent levels of public opinion in their misalignment or alignment with a state’s
foreignpolicy intent. Although there is an international target in the oﬃcialmedia’s behavior, this research
focuses on the domestic audience. The article begins by situating their crisis behavior in the general
pattern of the asymmetric relationship between China and Vietnam and the (mis)alignment theory. After
providing a brief overview of the Chinese and Vietnamese propaganda system and media control, the
article traces the crisis from both sides’ perspectives, followed by an analysis of possible alternative
explanations. The article ends with a brief discussion of the aftermath of the crisis, the likely path of
Sino-Vietnamese relations, and the broader implications of the relationship.
Asymmetry and domestic misalignment
It would be hard to dispute that Vietnam has an asymmetric relationship with China. Its population of 96
million is ﬁfteenth largest in the world, but roughly equal to the two adjoining Chinese provinces of
Guangxi and Yunnan and 7% of China’s total. Its Gross National Product is 3% of China’s. Vietnam’s total
tradewithChinawas 20%of its total trade in 2015, half again asmuch as its tradewith the rest of ASEANor
with theUnited States.12 Vietnam’smilitary budget is estimated at less than 1%of China’s, even thoughon
a per capita basis it spends more than twice as much of its GDP on the military.13 One-quarter of
international tourists to Vietnam in 2013 were from China, though the numbers went down after the oil
rig crisis. In ASEANmore generally Chinesewere 17%of all ASEAN tourists in 2015, by far the largest single
nationality and double the number of Europeans.14 From the viewpoint of China, Vietnam is a signiﬁcant
but notmajor trading partner at 2.4% of total trade, roughly the same asMalaysia and half that of Taiwan.
Clearly China is more powerful than Vietnam, and China is more important to Vietnam than Vietnam is
to China. It follows that Vietnam is structurally more exposed to China, in terms of both risk and
opportunity, than China is to Vietnam. Nevertheless, the 12 years of hostility demonstrated that neither
could impose its will on the other. Moreover, Vietnam’s earlier conﬂicts with relatively more powerful
opponents, France and the United States, conﬁrmed the resistance capacity of the smaller side in an
asymmetric relationship.15 Since 1991, there have been many tensions between China and Vietnam but
the tensions have not been allowed to threaten the overall relationship. In 2008, they announced a
‘comprehensive strategic partnership,’ which indicates a high but not exclusive status for the
relationship.16
This article ﬁnds that it is this asymmetry that induced a sense of insecurity in the Vietnamese
public, creating a stronger public opinion in Vietnam than in China, thus resulting in the state-
public misalignment in Vietnam but alignment in China. When the state intent is more moderate
12Calculated from data supplied by the General Statistics Oﬃce of Vietnam, available at: http://www.gso.gov.vn (accessed 28
December 2018).
13Calculated from CIA World Factbook, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed 28
December 2018).
14Calculated from ASEAN Statistics Database, available at: https://data.aseanstats.org/ (accessed 28 December 2018).
15Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
16Georg Strüver, ‘China’s partnership diplomacy: international alignment based on interest or ideology’, Chinese Journal of International
Politics 10(1), (2017), pp. 31–65; and Feng Zhongping, Huang Jing, ‘China’s strategic partnership diplomacy: engagingwith a changing
world’, European Strategic Partnerships ObservatoryWorking Paper 8 (June 2014), available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2459948 (accessed 28 December 2018).
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than public opinion, in this case Vietnam, the state uses a propaganda campaign to keep up the
appearances of a hard stand to appease the public on one hand, and on the other to mollify public
opinion by echoing their emotions and letting them vent. In this way, the state brings a strong
public opinion in line with its moderate policy intent. Media studies of the short attention span of
the public, social psychology studies on the soothing eﬀects of violence in media, and studies on
the tranquilizing eﬀects of social media, all oﬀer strong support for these mechanisms.17 This
pacifying function of the propaganda is diﬀerent from the common perception of propaganda, but
is commonly practiced, and increasingly so, by popular authoritarian states in working with rising
domestic nationalism. When public opinion and state policy are aligned, in this case China, the
state keeps quiet.
Media control and popular nationalism in China and Vietnam
Both Vietnam and China have party-state systems, in which the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV)
and the Communist Party of China (CPC) have the preponderant power in their respective country’s
political, economic and social life. All print media are owned by or under eﬀective control of the
respective Communist party. Although there are various degrees of commercialization among a
diverse range of media outlets, both states maintain eﬀective administrative and legal means to
regulate media. The government supervises senior personnel appointments at main media outlets,
monitors and censors media content on a day-to-day basis, issues general guidelines and speciﬁc
directives on what issues to cover and how they should be covered, and sanctions or even jails
journalists who act against the state mandate. By the end of the twentieth century, both countries
witnessed a burst of growth in the Internet and social media, which have provided a platform for
social activism.18 But the states have also adapted by developing more sophisticated tools such as
new censorship system, technologies, and Internet trolls, and by streamlining legal and organiza-
tional supervision.19
Having been through a long period of colonialization and several major wars against foreign
powers, Vietnam has a relatively shorter time for state building and economic development, so
arguably it has weaker central control than China. Moreover, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh
Vietnam did not experience political repression comparable to China’s Anti-Rightist Campaign of
17For Media Studies on the ‘issue attention cycle’ hypothesis that explains the public’s short attention span, see Frank R.
Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (University of Chicago Press, 2010); Carol A
Bodensteiner, ‘Predicting public and media attention span for social issues’, Public Relations Quarterly 40(2), (1995), p. 14;
Anthony Downs, ‘Up and down with ecology: the “Issue-attention cycle”’, The Public (1972). For Social Psychology studies on
the eﬀects of violence in media, see Joan Murray and Feshbach Seymour, ‘Let’s not throw the baby out with the bathwater:
the Catharsis hypothesis revisited’, Journal of Personality 46(3), (1978), pp. 462–473. For studies on the eﬀects of social media,
see Christopher Cairns and Allen Carlson, ‘Real-world islands in a social media sea: nationalism and censorship on Weibo
during the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku Crisis’, The China Quarterly 225, (2016), p. 49; Jonathan Hassid, ‘Safety valve or pressure
cooker? Blogs in Chinese political life’, Journal of Communication 62(2), (2012), pp. 212–230; and Rebecca MacKinnon, ‘Flatter
world and thicker walls? Blogs, censorship and civic discourse in China’, Public Choice 134(1–2), (2008), pp. 31–46.
18Some scholars argue for the Internet’s erosive eﬀects on the state control, see Daniel C. Lynch, After the Propaganda State:
Media, Politics, and ‘Thought Work’ in Reformed China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Geoﬀry Taubman, ‘A not-
so world wide web: the internet, China, and the challenges to nondemocratic rule’, Political Communication 15(2), (1998), pp.
255–272; Guobin Yang, The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online (New York City, NY: Columbia University
Press, 2009); and Jonathan Sullivan and Lei Xie, ‘Environmental activism, social networks and the internet’, The China
Quarterly 198(June), (2009), pp. 422–432.
19See Min Jiang, ‘The co-evolution of the internet, (un)civil society & authoritarianism in China’, in Jacques deLisle et al., ed., The
Internet, Social Media, and A Changing China (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016); Maria Repnikova and
Kecheng Fang, ‘Authoritarian participatory persuasion 2.0: netizens as thought work collaborators in China’, Journal of
Contemporary China 113(27), (2018), pp. 763–779; Jesper Schlæger and Min Jiang, ‘Oﬃcial microblogging and social
management by local governments in China’, China Information 28(2), (2014), pp. 189–213; Rongbin Han, 2015,
‘Defending the authoritarian regime online: china’s “Voluntary ﬁfty-cent army”’, The China Quarterly 224(December),
(2015), pp. 1006–1025; Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, ‘How the Chinese government fabricates social
media posts for strategic distraction, not engaged argument’, American Political Science Review 111(3), (2017), pp. 484–501;
and Rogier Creemers, ‘Cyber China: upgrading propaganda, public opinion work and social management for the twenty-ﬁrst
century’, Journal of Contemporary China 26(103), (2017), pp. 85–100.
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1957 or the Cultural Revolution. As a result, civil society is much more active in Vietnam than in
China. Internet use is also freer in Vietnam than in China. For example, Google and New York Times
websites are accessible in Vietnam but are blocked in China. Despite these diﬀerences in the
degree of control, the organizational and legal means for the CPV to tighten the rein of media
control when they feel the need are still in place and frequently resorted to.20 For example, Google
is required to maintain its servers inside Vietnam, so that it is easier for Hanoi to censor content
whenever it feels the need to.21 Freedom House reports that ‘In 2013, the [Vietnamese] govern-
ment increased its repression of print and online journalists, jailing more than twice as many
writers and bloggers in 2013 as it did the previous year.’22 ‘In September [2013], the state
introduced Decree 72, which restricted all websites and social media from publishing anything
that “provides information that is against Vietnam”.’23 Freedom House rates both countries a score
of 4 out of 16 in 2014 on ‘Freedom of Expression and Belief.’24
Besides the authoritarian rule and tight media control, both countries have witnessed the rise of
popular nationalism in recent years. Some scholars argue that this is a direct result of state instigation, in
part to divert public attention away from domestic problems such as rampant corruption, growing
inequality, and sluggish economic performance since the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis.25 Others argue
that nationalism is promoted to ﬁll the ideological gap to consolidate regime legitimacy after both
countries’ loosening the Marxist-Leninist ideals to incorporate the capitalist economic instruments.26
While there is ongoing debate about how much inﬂuence the public has over the state and the state
over the public in authoritarian states, the consensus is a mixed one. On one hand, there is increasing
evidence suggesting that genuine, bottom-up public opinion does exist. The rise of the Internet has
resulted in broader public engagement in foreign policy. Diversiﬁcation of information sources makes it
harder, if not impossible, for the government to hide a dispute entirely. Together with stronger nationalist
sentiment in the public, these changes putmore constraints to decision-making in foreignpolicy.27 But on
the other, the public’s inﬂuence is hardly ever decisive, as the state has a legion of resources andmeans to
change public opinion to meet its policy needs.28 This article focuses on one of these means.
The oil rig crisis from Hanoi’s perspective: defending the fatherland
At the beginning of the crisis, the Vietnamese government faced an existing strong public opinion,
yet the state itself preferred an overall moderate policy. Analysts observe a growing rift between a
20The U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors, ‘Media Use in Vietnam 2013’, available at:
http://www.bbg.gov/wp-content/media/2013/12/Vietnam-research-brief-ﬁnal1.pdf (accessed 28 December 2018).
21The Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2014, Vietnam’, available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/
2014/vietnam (accessed 28 December 2018).
22Ibid.
23Ibid.
24Ibid.; Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2014, China’, available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/
2014/china (accessed 28 December 2018).
25Le Hong Hiep, ‘Performance-based legitimacy: the case of the communist party of Vietnam and Doi Moi’, Contemporary
Southeast Asia 34(2), (2012), pp. 145–172.
26Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-state by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2004); and Peter H. Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Stanford, CA: University of California
Press, 2004).
27See, for example, Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen, ‘The domestic context of Chinese foreign policy: does “Public opinion”
matter?’, in David M. Lampton ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978–2000
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp. 151–187; Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and
Diplomacy (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2004); James Reilly, 2011, Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public
Opinion in China’s Japan Policy (New York City, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011); Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007); Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction; Suisheng Zhao, ‘China’s pragmatic
nationalism: is it manageable?’, The Washington Quarterly 29(1), (2005), pp. 131–144; and Suisheng Zhao, ‘Foreign policy
implications of Chinese nationalism revisited: the strident turn’, Journal of Contemporary China 22(82), (2013), pp. 535–553.
28Almost all of the above studies recognize the limited role of public opinion in inﬂuencing foreign policy in these states. For
speciﬁc means that states adopt to subdue popular nationalism, see Kai Quek and Alastair Iain Johnston, 2018, ‘Can China
back down? Crisis de-escalation in the shadow of popular opposition’, International Security 42(3), (2018), pp. 7–36.
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nationalist public and a reserved government in Vietnam during the oil rig crisis. Malesky and
Morris-Jung note that ‘the oil rig crisis highlighted a growing gap between state leadership and the
wider Vietnamese society’ and ‘increasing polarization between state and society.’29 Bui’s examina-
tion of 570 Thanh Nien News (Youth News) articles during the crisis also shows ‘some gap between
the oﬃcial news stories and readers’ comments,’ and that ‘The public’s response is arguably more
emotional and more demanding of a tougher position.’30
The surge in Vietnamese public opinion against China regarding South China Sea sovereignty
issues could be traced back to 2007. A senior Chinese Vietnam specialist revealed that anti-China
protests on the South China Sea dispute started in 2007 when internal Chinese consideration of
elevating the administrative status of Sansha County to the prefecture level leaked to Hanoi. Hanoi
decided to mobilize college students to stage regular protests to pressure the Chinese to drop the
plan.31 The staged anti-China protests succeeded in deterring Beijing from pursuing the Sansha
City plan until June 2012, when the Vietnamese National Assembly passed the ‘Vietnamese Law of
the Sea’ making claims to the Paracels and the Spratlys. Beijing retaliated by following through
with the Sansha City plan one month later. The regular weekend protests, however, raised
awareness and intensiﬁed emotions on the dispute among the Vietnamese public, marking the
beginning of a downward spiral in the Vietnamese public opinion against China.
The strong public opinion on the South China Sea dispute against China gained momentum at
the encouragement of America’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy, with a benchmark event in July 2010
featuring a heated debate at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi led by the then US State
Secretary Hilary Clinton. Vietnam’s nationalist public opinion reached a small climax in the summer
of 2011 when Chinese maritime patrol ships severed the seismic survey cables of Vietnamese
energy exploration vessels on two occasions. Angry Vietnamese once again took to the street, but
this time more bottom-up than top-down. The protests continued for 2 months.32
The bilateral relationship received a respite from the South China Sea dispute in 2013 and early 2014.
But even during this relatively calm period, anti-China rallies ﬂared anew in the summer of 2013 andwere
cracked down by the government, demonstrating the ongoing genuine and strong public emotions on
the issue.33 A Pew Global Attitudes Survey taken during 16 April–8May 2014 in Vietnam right before and
at the very beginning of the oil rig crisis shows that 78%of respondents had unfavorable opinion of China
and only 16% of respondents had favorable opinion. This contrasts sharply to the Vietnamese’ over-
whelming favorability towards all other major powers in the region—the United States (76% favorable),
Russia (75% favorable), Japan (79% favorable), and India (67% favorable).34
Yet logical deductions and evidence of the actual policy pursued by Hanoi suggest a moderate
state policy intent. First, Hanoi had little incentive to escalate the tension and damage the bilateral
relationship with China. The Vietnamese economy was asymmetrically dependent on China. Prior
to the crisis, China had become Vietnam’s largest trading partner, reaching about $50 billion total
turnover in 2013.35 China was also ‘the sixth-largest investor by the number of projects and
fourteenth largest by the total capital (about $14.7 billion) invested, respectively.’36 Given China’s
rapidly growing appetite for overseas investment, there was great potential for further growth in
bilateral investment.
29Edmund Malesky and Jason Morris-Jung, ‘Vietnam in 2014: uncertainty and opportunity in the wake of the HS-981 crisis’,
Asian Survey 55(1), (2015), p. 169, p. 170.
30Bui, ‘Managing anti-China nationalism in Vietnam’, p. 183.
31Interview with Chinese analyst, 20 November 2017, Washington DC.
32Interview with Vietnamese analyst who experienced ﬁrsthand the protests against the cable cutting incidents, 21 February
2017, Hanoi.
33‘Rare Protest in Vietnam Raises a Call to Curb China’, New York Times, (3 June 2013), available at: http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/06/03/world/asia/rare-protest-in-vietnam-raises-call-to-curb-china.html (accessed 28 December 2018).
34Pew Research Center Global Attitudes and Trends Datasets, available at: http://www.pewglobal.org/datasets/ (accessed 28
December 2018).
35‘China remains Vietnam’s biggest trade partner in 2013‘, Xinhua News, (29 January 2014), available at: http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/business/chinadata/2014-01/29/content_17264283.htm (accessed 28 December 2018).
36Malesky and Morris-Jung, ‘Vietnam in 2014‘, p. 172.
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Admittedly, Hanoi’s attitude towards the public protests at the beginning of crisis was permis-
sive, at times even encouraging. The Vietnamese police watched on as hundreds (which later grew
into thousands) of demonstrators marched the streets of cities around the country and protested
outside the Chinese embassy.37 They even cheered the demonstrators on by ‘broadcasting com-
plaints about China’s actions’ using loudspeakers ‘atop police vans,’ inviting state television to
record the event, and handing out banners saying ‘We entirely trust the party, the government and
the people’s army.’38 Nevertheless, Hanoi was well aware of the danger of public protests turning
against itself. The violent riots that took place on 13–14 May 2014 gave a sobering alarm to the CPV
leaders that the strong public opinion, if left unfettered, could go out of hand. Scores of factories
were damaged in the rampage, including those managed by South Koreans and Taiwanese. One
Chinese company reported four deaths and 130 casualties.39 The Vietnamese leadership responded
quickly, arresting 300 persons involved in the rioting. China evacuated more than 3000 of its
citizens and, not surprisingly, Chinese tourism dried up.40 As General Hoang Cong Tu of the
Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security put it, ‘they [the rioters] have seriously undermined the
country’s image, and such action has to be punished.’41
No government looks kindly on riots, but the CPV had two additional reasons to worry about
anti-China disturbances. First, it could not aﬀord to adopt oﬃcially an anti-China stance. In its
asymmetric relationship with China, Vietnam has learned the price of hostility.42 Its 1979 border
war with China led to ten years of stalemate and contributed to international isolation. Any
responsible Vietnamese government would have to live with China. The islands in the South
China Sea arouse the popular imagination because they involve claims of national territory, but
they are less important than the rest of the China–Vietnam relationship.
Second, the leadership knew well that anti-China sentiment could easily connect to an anti-regime
agenda. An open letter by 61 party members in late July illustrates the linkage: on one hand, the letter
called for ‘liberating . . . from dependence upon China’ and ‘promptly sue China at an international
tribunal’; on the other, it blamed the regime for the current situation, and demanded ‘abandoning the
erroneous policies of building socialism and decisively veering towards a national and democratic
direction, focusing on amoderate transformation of the political regime from its present totalitarianism
to a democratic system.’43 Senior Vietnamese analysts aﬃliated with a government think tank point to
the internal debate and the cleavage between the anti-China, the more liberal faction led by the Prime
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and the pro-China, the more conservative faction led by the Party General
Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, with one constantly checked and balanced by the other.44 This is also
evident in the CPV Central Committee’s ninth plenary session, which took place during 8–14May 2014,
a few days after the Chinese placement of the oil rig and whilst the riots broke out. Thayer reports that
‘A heated debate erupted about how Vietnam should respond to China’s challenge.’45
37For a more detailed account of the anti-China protests in Vietnam, see John D. Ciorciari and Jessica Chen Weiss, ‘Nationalist
protests, government responses, and the risk of escalation in interstate disputes’, Security Studies 25(3), (2016), pp. 546–583.
38‘Vietnam allows anti- China protest over oil rig’, Daily Mail, (10 May 2014), available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/
article-2625366/Vietnam-allows-anti-China-protest-oil-rig.html (accessed 10 May 2018).
39Gerry Mulany, ‘Chinese company puts death toll in Vietnam riots at 4‘, New York Times, (21 May 2014), available at: https://
sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/chinese-company-puts-death-toll-in-vietnam-riots-at-4/ (accessed 28 December
2018).
40Jane Perlez, ‘Vietnamese oﬃcials intolerant of violence as standoﬀ with China continues’, New York Times, (17 May 2014),
available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/world/asia/vietnamese-oﬃcials-intolerant-of-violence-as-standoﬀ-with-
china-continues.html (accessed 28 December 2018).
41Ibid.
42Womack, China and Vietnam.
43‘An open letter by 61 party members to the central executive committee and all members of the communist party of
Vietnam’, (28 July 2014), available at: https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/ﬁles/custom_search/Letter%20from
%2061%20Vietnamese%20Party%20members.pdf (accessed 28 December 2018).
44Interview with two Vietnamese analysts, 23 February 2014, Hanoi.
45Carl Thayer, ‘4 reasons China removed oil rig HYSY-981 sooner than planned’, The Diplomat, (22 July 2014), available at:
https://thediplomat.com/2014/07/4-reasons-china-removed-oil-rig-hysy-981-sooner-than-planned/ (accessed 28 December
2018).
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As the oil rig crisis continued, Hanoi adopted a three-pronged response—sending law enfor-
cement vessels to the location of the rig to protest and disrupt the Chinese activities; establishing
bilateral channels for negotiations; and rallying international pressure to force the Chinese to
retreat. Admittedly, this can be seen as a hardline stance. China accused Vietnam for ramming
Chinese ships ‘for a total of 1416 times,’ in addition to ‘send[ing] frogmen and other underwater
agents to the area, and dropped large numbers of obstacles, including ﬁshing nets and ﬂoating
objects, in the waters.’46 But it was not clear whether the Vietnamese vessels were there merely
to voice protest, or they were aggressively breaking through the Chinese cordon and disrupting
the Chinese activities by ramming Chinese ships. The authors estimate that there was some
ramming initiated by both sides as well as incidental collisions due to the crowded space. A ship’s
actions could also be easily misunderstood for aggressiveness given such a situation. While the
jury is still out on this point, one thing certain is that the Vietnamese presence in the disputed
area was required if it were to maintain its claim strength to the Paracels. As Womack points out,
‘The method of establishing territorial claims in international law has the pernicious eﬀect of
maximizing confrontation and hostility. . . unchallenged occupation is nine-tenths of the law.
Thus each has an incentive to increase its presence and to protest or oppose occupation by
others, and all parties to the dispute have done both repeatedly over the past forty years.’47
Therefore, the lack of action on the Vietnamese part could potentially be damaging to the
Vietnamese claim. So even if the Chinese accusation were true, the Vietnamese actions had a
defensive nature.
In addition, Hanoi was very proactive in seeking out bilateral channels with their Chinese counterparts.
‘Immediately after the oil rig crisis broke out, Vietnam’s leaders adopted a conciliatory diplomatic
posture.’48 Hanoi requested the activation of a hotline between senior leaders, oﬀered to send a special
envoy, and pressed for a visit by its party general secretary. With all things considered, Vietnam’s actual
policy was reactive and proportionate, indicating a moderate policy intent.
The state-public misalignment thus required the CPV to align public opinion with its intended
moderate policy before its implementation. Hanoi utilized the pacifying function of the propaganda—
one that is not commonly known but is increasingly practiced by popular autocrats, to clear the way for a
moderate foreign policy.
First, Hanoi used the harsh rhetoric to keep up the appearances of a tough stance towards
China to appeal to the public demand, but issued no threats of substantive punishment. The
challenge of nationalistic public criticism was strong and real. Bui reports that ‘[readers] posted
comments [below the news articles] were critical of the government’s late reporting of the oil
rig installation and the relatively mild statements by the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs spokes-
person in the ﬁrst few days.’49 To appease the nationalistic public demand, the state issued
strongly-worded statements, condemning the Chinese actions as ‘brazen,’ ‘illegal,’ and
‘intimidating.’50 At the ASEAN Summit on May 11, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan
Dung made a high-proﬁle pitch to other ASEAN leaders and criticized China’s behavior as a
‘direct threat’ to regional peace and stability. Vietnamese media covered these statements
extensively.
But none of these statements had real teeth. Hanoi issued only vague and weak threats such
as ‘Vietnam has to take defensive measures in response’ or ‘Vietnam will take appropriate
measures.’51 When asked whether Vietnam will follow the example of the Philippines to sue
46PRC MoFA, ‘The operation of the HYSY 981 drilling rig: Vietnam’s provocation and China’s position’, (8 June 2014), available
at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1163264.shtml (accessed 28 December 2018).
47Brantly Womack, ‘The Spratlys: from dangerous ground to apple of discord,’ Contemporary Southeast Asia 33(3), (2011), pp.
373–374.
48Thayer, ‘4 reasons’.
49Bui, ‘Managing Anti-China Nationalism in Vietnam’, p. 180.
50SRV MoFA, ‘Regular Press Brieﬁng by MOFA’s Spokesperson Le Hai Binh On 15 May 2014‘, (15 May 2014), available at: http://
www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns140516233943 (accessed 28 December 2018).
51Bui, ‘Managing Anti-China Nationalism in Vietnam’, p. 175.
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China in international court, the Foreign Ministry did not provide a clear answer.52 Even Prime
Minister Dung, the strongest advocate of the legal action, stated that ‘timing was crucial.’53
Defense Minister Phung Quang Thanh’s remark at the Shangri-La Dialogue on May 31 that the
legal action was only ‘a last resort’ also conﬁrms the hollow content of the strong rhetoric.54
The Vietnamese media also gave broad coverage to the confrontations in the conﬂict zone. But
instead of focusing on the Chinese aggressiveness, the media focused on the ‘heroic’ actions of the
Vietnamese maritime law enforcement oﬃcers in ‘defending the fatherland.’ In Bui’s analysis of the
Thanh Nien News articles, this theme took up the majority of the articles (146 of 570 articles
(25.6%)). This type of framing serves the purpose of showcasing that the government was taking
active actions, in order to fend oﬀ the nationalistic criticisms against the government. This media
approach to ‘channel popular anger and animosity into a more positive form of pro-government
nationalism’ conﬁrms the causal logic of the alignment theory.55
Secondly, the state used the propaganda campaign to subdue the strong public emotions so
that a moderate policy could eventually be carried out. On one hand, the state allowed the public
to vent on social media and online comment sections. Unless the online posts explicitly targeted at
the Vietnamese leadership or called for collective actions, public discussions to express outrage
and vent frustrations were generally allowed and even encouraged. On the other, the state walked
the ﬁne line between criticizing the Chinese actions and avoiding intensifying anti-China senti-
ments. The state achieved this through three approaches. Firstly, the Vietnamese government
channeled public anger toward patriotism and national unity, as mentioned earlier. Bui ﬁnds Thanh
Nien News articles highlight ‘the need for national unity, encouragement for maritime enforcement
oﬃcers, relief for aﬀected ﬁshermen, and above all, conﬁdence in the government’s ability to
resolve the situation.’56 Secondly, the government echoed anti-China public emotions in modera-
tion and in third persons such as foreign observers.57 Echoing provides a sense of agreement and
support; but echoing in moderation and in foreign observers’ assessments prevents the exacerba-
tion of the nationalist emotions and avoids unintended escalations with the foreign rival. Lastly, the
government refrained from referencing to historical disputes. The fact that very few articles
referenced to the historical disputes between the two countries is strong evidence that the
Vietnamese government was not overly enthusiastic about inciting domestic public emotion on
the current crisis. Recalling historical grievances is the easiest way to ignite public hatred. But
‘China’s forceful expulsion of Vietnamese forces from the Crescent Group in the Paracel islands in
1974, the Johnson South Reef skirmish in 1988, or even the border war in 1979 were hardly
mentioned in most reports.’58
The oil rig crisis from Beijing’s perspective: keeping quiet
The Chinese media behavior stood in stark contrast with the Vietnamese. The government made
conscious eﬀorts to control information, discourage coverage, and even censor content. This is due
to the overall alignment of the state and the public on the issue, with an existing moderate public
opinion and a moderate state policy intent.
Compared to the extensive coverage in Vietnam, the Chinese were remarkably quiet. Beijing’s
reluctance to publicize the dispute was evident in four media features. First, Beijing deliberately
52SRV MoFA, ‘International press conference on China’s downed drilling rig in Vietnam’s waters’, (7 May 2014), available at:
http://www.mofa.gov.vn/vi/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns140509011156 (accessed 28 December 2018).
53Thayer, ‘4 reasons’.
54Shangri_La Dialogue Report, 13th Asia Security Summit, Singapore, May 30—1 June 2014, International Institute for Strategic
Studies, p. 29, available at: https://www.iiss.org/-/media/Silos/ShangriLa/2014/Shangri-La-Dialogue-Report-2014.pdf (accessed
28 December 2018).
55Ibid., p. 169.
56Ibid., p. 169.
57Ibid., p. 179.
58Ibid.
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delayed the reporting of the riots in Vietnam. Anti-China protests in Hanoi and a few other cities
started on 11 May and escalated to violent riots on the 13th and 14th. But Xinhua News did not
release any Chinese report until midnight of the 15th—that is almost two days’ delay. Other
Chinese media all cautiously followed Xinhua’s steps.59
Second, Beijing limited the coverage. People’s Daily, the most authoritative oﬃcial Chinese
newspaper, had little coverage of the dispute at all—a total of 36 articles and no front-page
articles during the 74 days of the crisis between 2 May– 15 July. China’s limited reportage was only
reactive to Vietnam’s aggressive propaganda campaign, especially its international campaign.
Chinese MoFA spokesperson Hua Chunying said on June 9th Press Conference: ‘[Vietnam] spread-
ing rumors around the world to vilify and hurt China unscrupulously and groundlessly. Given that,
we must present the facts in front of the international community so as to set the record straight.’
Besides this reactive coverage, the Chinese reporting was sparse.
Third, Beijing buried the coverage in low-traﬃc sections of the papers. Similar patterns were
observed on all oﬃcial media outlets and major commercial news portals.60 On the day People’s
Daily and Xinhua News reported the riots, both websites had domestic news as headlines, while
having news on the riots only as the fourth and the ﬁfth item. This technique made the dispute less
visible, while still making information available if people searched for it. In this way, the CPC could
dampen the issue without leaving the issue to the whims of the Western media.
Fourth, Beijing softened the tone in accusing Hanoi. After the riots, Chinese MoFA spokesperson
Hua Chunying blamed the violence on the ‘Vietnamese government’s indulgence and connivance
toward domestic anti-China forces and criminals.’61 But the wording in the ﬁnal released oﬃcial
transcript was changed to ‘the Vietnamese side has an inescapable responsibility. . .’62 Compared to
‘responsibility,’ ‘connivance’ was a more serious accusation.
These media features corroborate the media policy directives leaked by China Digital Times.63
There are four leaked policy directives on the dispute. On 7 May, propaganda authorities instructed
online media to ‘continue to ﬁnd and delete reports on Sino-Vietnamese ship collisions and
maritime standoﬀ.’64 On the anti-China riots, an order was issued on 14 May to ‘not report on
the issue, republish foreign coverage, or allow discussion in online forums.’65 After Xinhua released
the news, the order was changed on the 15th to ‘use only the Xinhua copy or information from the
Foreign Ministry’s website.’66 On the 18th, the state issued a second warning that the media must
‘use Xinhua copy only.’67 The authors’ interviews with Chinese editors and journalists also conﬁrm
59‘中国媒体谨慎报道越南事态’ [‘Chinese Media Cautious in Reporting the Vietnam Incident’], BBC Chinese, (16 May 2014),
available at: http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2014/05/140516_china_vietnam_press (accessed 28 December
2018).
60Andrew Chubb, ‘China’s information management in the Sino-Vietnamese confrontation: caution and sophistication in the
internet era’, China Brief 14(11), (2014), p. 15.
61‘Vietnam factory protests result in 2 dead, 129 injured; Chinese workers ﬂee’, Bloomberg News, (15 May 2014), available at:
http://www.oregonlive.com/playbooks-proﬁts/index.ssf/2014/05/vietnam_factory_protests_resul.html (accessed 28
December 2018).
62PRC MoFA, ‘Foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying’s regular press conference on 15 May 2014‘, available at: http://
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1156451.shtml (accessed 28 December 2018).
63China Digital Times regularly publishes leaked directives from Chinese propaganda agencies. Although useful, this source
needs to be cross-checked by further evidence.
64真理部 [The Truth Department], ‘高瑜,外逃贪官,邓力群,越南海军和比特币’ [‘Gao Yu, Fled Corrupt Oﬃcials, Deng Liqun,
Vietnamese Navy and Bitcoin’], China Digital Times, (7 May 2014), available at: https://goo.gl/mpFi7s (accessed 28 December
2018).
65真理部 [The Truth Department), ‘在越中资企业被越南人冲击’ [‘Chinese Companies in Vietnam Were Attacked’], China
Digital Times, (14 May 2014), available at: https://goo.gl/uT1Evq (accessed 28 December 2018).
66真理部 [The Truth Department], ‘在越企业, 魏鹏远, 转基因粮油和深圳快播’ [‘Chinese Companies in Vietnam, Wei
Pengyuan, Genetically Modiﬁed Grain and Oil, and Shenzhen QVOD Player’], China Digital Times, (15 May 2014), available
at: https://goo.gl/v94Dyn (accessed 28 December 2018).
67真理部 [The Truth Department], ‘新疆喀什案, 越南企业和中国的挨打史’ [‘Xinjiang Kashgar Incident, Factories in
Vietnam, and A Chinese History of Being Bullied’], China Digital Times, (18 May 2014), available at: https://goo.gl/4JhQKu
(accessed 28 December 2018).
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these leaked directives. Editors from a hardline newspaper revealed that after publishing a couple
of articles on the topic, they were asked to ‘tone down their voice.’68
Why did the Chinese authorities not stoke nationalism and use it to coerce Hanoi into accepting
the fait accompli on the sea? This is due to the state-public alignment on the issue: the state
intended an overall moderate policy, so it wanted to reserve policy ﬂexibility by restricting public
participation; the existing weak public opinion allowed the government to pursue such a policy
without having to resort to the propaganda’s pacifying eﬀect like Hanoi did. In other words, the
state did not need to pacify an already moderate public.
Despite the appearance of Chinese provocation by moving the oil rig into a disputed area and
engaging in dangerous confrontation with the Vietnamese ships, strong evidence suggests that
Beijing had a moderate policy intent.
Why China moved the oil rig to disputed waters in the ﬁrst place is still debated. As mentioned
earlier, the bilateral relationship was showing a promising upward trend since early 2013 that
Beijing should have little incentive to disrupt. Prior to the crisis, the two countries had enjoyed a
rather cordial relationship, marked by the exchange of high-level visits by Vietnamese President
Truong Tan Sang to Beijing in June 2013 and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to Hanoi in October
2013. During these visits, the two sides restated their commitment to peace and stability in the
South China Sea. As a concrete achievement, the China-Vietnam expert group for low-sensitivity
maritime cooperation and consultation was established in December 2013, just months before
the crisis was touched oﬀ.69 China also engaged with ASEAN on the Implementation of the
Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) at the tenth joint working group
meeting in Singapore on 18 March 2014 and was working out a number of conﬁdence building
measures under the DOC at the seventh ASEAN-China Senior Oﬃcials’ Meeting on the
Implementation of the DOC in Thailand on 21 April 2014. These occurred just weeks before the
placement of the oil rig.
Therefore, the placement of the oil rig came as a shock to many observers, as it reversed the
previous Chinese behavior and did not appear like an ad hoc decision made by an unruly CNOOC
acting alone. According to the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, the oil rig was protected by ‘109 and
125 vessels’ formed in ‘3 rings,’ ‘including 4–6 warships, 2 missile frigates numbered 534 and 572
operating at 20–25 nautical miles from the oil rig, 2 pairs of minesweepers vessels numbered 840,
843 or 839, 842 (rotating daily) at about 15–25 nautical miles from the rig, and 2 pairs of fast attack
ships numbered 751, 756, or 753 and an unidentiﬁed ship (rotating daily).’70 As Chinese scholar Shi
Yinhong points out, no agency other than the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) can command
navy warships, especially on this scale.71 The military was clearly involved.
What then explains this sudden reversal of the Chinese behavior? Among the many specula-
tions, an explanation of irrational decision making combining a lack of interorganizational coordi-
nation, an underestimate of Vietnamese reaction, and path dependency seems to prevail.72 If this
explanation is true, the Chinese initial provocation was then a result of unintended miscalculation.
As disclosed in private interviews to policy analysts close to the decision-making process, moving
the oil rig to the disputed area was ‘without the proper consultation with the Foreign Ministry, and
likely without direct involvement of the top leadership.’73 A retired government oﬃcial frequently
consulted on Vietnamese aﬀairs attests: ‘our policy (in placing the rig) in 2014 was not very
68Interviews with Chinese editors, May 29 and 31 May 2017, Beijing.
69PRC MoFA, ‘China and Vietnam held plenary meeting of the governmental delegation on border negotiation’, (7 December
2013), available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1108277.shtml (accessed 28 December 2018).
70SRV MoFA, ‘The 6th regular press conference’, (26 June 2014), available at: http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/tcbc/
ns140628000810 (accessed 28 December 2018).
71Jane Perlez, ‘Vietnamese oﬃcials intolerant of violence’.
72For an enumeration of these speculations, see Carl Thayer, ‘China’s oil rig gambit: South China sea game-changer?’, The
Diplomat, (12 May 2014), available at: https://thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-oil-rig-gambit-south-china-sea-game-chan
ger/ (accessed 28 December 2018).
73Interview with Chinese analyst, 31 May 2017, Beijing.
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stable. . .it was not a decision made by the top leadership after careful rumination.’74 When asked
on 11 June 2014 to conﬁrm the Vietnamese remarks that ‘China has sent six warships to guard its
oil rig,’ Chinese MoFA spokesperson Hua Chunying replied ‘we have sent government vessels to
the site for security.’75 ‘Government vessels’ should mean maritime law enforcement vessels, not
navy ships. This happened again on June 13 with MoFA Deputy Director General of the
Department of Boundary and Ocean Aﬀairs Yi Xianliang. When asked whether the Vietnamese
statement about China sending navy warships was true, Yi said ‘. . .we had to send Coast Guard
ships. . .’76 It is not clear, however, whether Hua and Yi were skillfully deﬂecting the question or
simply not notiﬁed of the navy ships. In late August, Vietnamese special envoy Le Hong Anh visited
Beijing in an eﬀort to mend fences. In his talks with Chinese Party seniors, he unusually stressed the
need for the two parties to ‘tighten their instructions.’ The words ‘tighten instructions’ were
repeated four times in a short two-page report of the meeting.77 This implies that the explanation
given privately to Anh involved a lack of coordination on the Chinese side.
A Crisis Group report oﬀers a slightly diﬀerent story, but also conﬁrms the irrational decision
model. Based on an interview with a ‘security agency-aﬃliated Chinese analyst,’ the report asserts
that ‘The Central Leading Small Group on the Protection of Maritime Interests, created in 2012 and
reportedly led, at least initially, directly by Xi, made the decision in the oil rig case. The foreign
ministry was said to be represented by the Department of Boundary and Ocean Aﬀairs, whose
“primary concern is sovereignty”, without Department of Asian Aﬀairs input.’ Thus the decision was
made without ‘consultation with experts who understand Vietnam.’78 The authors’ interviews with
Chinese experts routinely consulted on Vietnamese Aﬀairs by Beijing indirectly conﬁrms this latter
point. They said that the placement of the rig ‘came as a shock,’ which implies that they were not
consulted on the placement of the oil rig.79 The Crisis Group report also points out that ‘in internal
memos, closed-door conferences, and brieﬁngs to senior oﬃcials,’ the mainstream view among
Chinese analysts was that the decision was erroneous and unwise.80
There also seems to be an element of path dependency in the decision. In June 2012, in
retaliation to Vietnam’s state oil and gas group PetroVietnam’s plan to invite Japanese ﬁrms to
participate in the joint development of about 20 oil and gas projects81 and the ‘Vietnamese Law of
the Sea’ passed by the Vietnamese National Assembly, CNOOC announced just a few days later the
invitation of international bids for 9 oil and gas blocks.82 This explains why Chinese MoFA spokes-
person had at various occasions claimed that similar Chinese exploration and drilling activities had
been going on for ‘a decade in the same waters,’ and this was only a ‘natural continuation’ of past
activities.83
74Interview with retired government oﬃcial who worked on Vietnamese aﬀairs, 2 June 2017, Beijing.
75PRC MoFA, ‘Foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying’s regular press conference on 11 June 2014‘, available at: http://
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1164598.shtml (accessed 28 December 2018).
76PRC MoFA, ‘外交部边海司副司长易先良就中建南项目举行吹风会’ [‘Deputy Director General of the Department of
Boundary and Ocean Aﬀairs Yi Xianliang’s Press Conference on the Zhongjiannan Project’], (14 June 2014), available at:
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjb_673085/zzjg_673183/t1165600.shtml (accessed 28 December 2018).
77‘Vietnam, China agree to restore, develop ties’, Nhan Dan/VNA, (27 August 2014), available at: http://en.nhandan.org.vn/
politics/external-relations/item/2753802-na-chairman-meets-young-japanese-parliamentarians.html (accessed 28 December
2018).
78International Crisis Group, ‘Stirring up the South China Sea (III): a ﬂeeting opportunity for calm’, Report No. 267, (7 May 2015),
p. 10, available at: https://www.crisisgroup. org/asia/north-east-asia/china/stirring-south-china-sea-iii-ﬂeeting-opportunity-
calm (accessed 28 December 2018).
79Interview with Chinese analyst, Washington DC, 20 November 2017.
80International Crisis Group, ‘Stirring up the South China Sea’, p. 5.
81‘Vietnam to propose oil, gas development with Japan,’ Thanh Nien News, 13 June 2012, available at: http://www.thanhnien
news.com/business/vietnam-to-propose-oil-gas-development-with-japan-media-6807.html (accessed 28 December 2018).
82‘中海油在南海开放9个区块与外国公司合作开发’ [‘CNOOC Opens Tender to Foreign Companies for 9 Oil and Gas
Blocks’], Tencent News, (26 June 2012), available at: https://news.qq.com/a/20120626/001565.htm (accessed 28 December
2018).
83These wordings have been mentioned at multiple occasions, for an example, see PRC MoFA, ‘Foreign ministry spokesperson
Hua Chunying’s regular press conference on 18 June 2014’, 19 June 2014, available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1166826.shtml (accessed 28 December 2018).
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Hanoi reacted vehemently to the Chinese placement of the oil rig. After a phone call between
Vietnam Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh and China’s State Councilor Yang Jiechi on May 6 failed
to reach an agreement, Hanoi appealed to the UN, the ASEAN, and the United States for support.84
On 7 May, Vietnam circulated a note at the UN to protest the Chinese action. On 11 May, Vietnam
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung delivered a speech at the 24th ASEAN Summit, stressing that ‘the
incident constituted a direct threat to peace, stability, maritime safety and security in the East
Sea.’85 On 6 May, the US State Department spokesperson singled out China’s behavior as ‘provo-
cative and unhelpful.’86 The US State released a press statement the next day accusing China’s
‘unilateral action’ as ‘part of a broader pattern of Chinese behavior to advance its claims over
disputed territory in a manner that undermines peace and stability in the region.’87 On 21 May,
Vietnam Foreign Minister Pham Bihn Minh called US secretary of State John Kerry to discuss the
matter.
Caught oﬀ-guard by the chain of reactions and realizing the grave risk of tipping the
Vietnamese domestic political scale further towards the anti-China factions, Beijing needed a
face-saving retreat as a way out of the conundrum. Retreating immediately was not an option,
because that would signal Beijing’s weakness to both a domestic and an international audience.
State Councilor Yang Jiechi’s visit to Hanoi on 18 June was a strong signal that both sides were
willing to work out a peaceful solution. The Vietnam-China Joint Steering Committee for Bilateral
Cooperation, under whose umbrella State Councilor Yang visited Hanoi, ‘ha[s] an established
practice of meeting annually,’ but the speciﬁc timing of the meeting was decided on short notice.88
As is common with Chinese foreign policy practice, using seemingly routine meetings at long-
established multilateral or bilateral frameworks is a traditional face-saving way for Chinese leaders
to initiate talks on more urgent matters without appearing too eager. In Beijing’s perspective, the
Vietnamese government tolerated, if not ‘connived,’ the rioters in burning down several Chinese-
owned factories and caused deaths and damages, so China should not appear too eager to
make up.
Beijing also needed to stand its ground on the sea in the confrontations with Vietnamese ships
in order to uphold its territorial claims and to protect the valuable and vulnerable oil rig. As for
Hanoi’s accusation of the Chinese physical aggressiveness on the sea, such as ramming Vietnamese
ships and ﬁring water cannons, the Chinese cordon was obviously there to protect the oil rig, not
to harass the Vietnamese ships, unless they misunderstood the Vietnamese ships’ intentions. Even
the Vietnamese MoFA spokesperson used the word ‘protect’ when he was referring to the Chinese
behavior.89 Besides, as mentioned earlier, incidental collisions in such a crowded space was almost
inevitable.
Some also cite examples of economic sanctions as Chinese aggressive intention towards
Vietnam. Malesky and Morris-Jung state that ‘Retail trade with China dipped noticeably in the
second half of 2014,’90 but Poh reports that ‘the trade account between China and Vietnam in 2014
continued to increase.’91 The authors’ examination of data from the World Integrated Trade
84Vietnam MoFA, ‘Họp báo quốc tế về việc Trung Quốc hạ đặt giàn khoan trái phép trong vùng biển Việt Nam
[‘International press conference on China’s drilling rig in Vietnam’s waters’], (7 May 2014), available at: http://www.mofa.
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85Vietnam MoFA, ‘Regular press brieﬁng by MOFA’s spokesperson Le Hai Binh on 15 May 2014‘, (15 May 2014), available at:
http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns140516233943 (accessed 9 May 2018).
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www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1166317.shtml (accessed 28 December 2018).
89Vietnam MoFA, ‘The 6th regular press conference’, (28 June 2014), available at: http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/tcbc/
ns140628000810 (accessed 28 December 2018).
90Malesky and Morris-Jung, ‘Vietnam in 2014,’ p. 172.
91Angela Poh, ‘The myth of Chinese sanctions over south China sea disputes’, The Washington Quarterly 40(1), (2017), p. 153.
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Solution (WITS) and the General Statistics Oﬃce of Vietnam (GSOV) conﬁrms Poh’s observation.92
Total retail bilateral trade increased from US$ 50.0 billion in 2013 to 58.6 billion in 2014, and
continued to rise since. The second half of 2014 did not dip either, with the ﬁrst half of 27.8 billion
and the second half of 30.8 billion. The only dip is in tourism, but the travel advisories and
cancelled chartered ﬂights were not limited to China.93 According to Poh’s interviews with
Vietnamese diplomats and analysts, although sanctions were expected, they were not employed,
or not even threatened.
Fortunately, Beijing did not face a strong public opinion as Hanoi did, so pursuing a
moderate policy was relatively easier. Despite the overall strong nationalism in China on the
South China Sea dispute, the public held a relatively mild opinion towards the speciﬁc dispute
with Vietnam in 2014. The year 2013 and the ﬁrst half of 2014 was an uneventful time between
China and Vietnam on the dispute. The absence of any major disturbance for an extended
period of time allowed the nationalist emotions to subside temporarily. Although still having
the potential to be rekindled, the Chinese nationalist sentiment on this dispute at this
particular time was calm—much to the contrast on the Vietnamese. Several journalists and
editors interviewed observe public opinion before and during the crisis to be ‘calm,’ if not
‘aloof,’ and ‘deﬁnitely less feverish than before the 2012 Sino-Philippines Scarborough Shoal
standoﬀ or the 2016 Sino-Philippines arbitration case.’ Except for the riots, they saw ‘little news
value’ in the dispute.94
The Baidu Search Index (BSI), an analytic tool that tracks the daily volume of search activity on
given keywords on Baidu.com, China’s dominant search engine, oﬀers a useful measurement for
the level of public attention in China. Figure 1 shows the daily search index of the word ‘South
China Sea’ in the BSI during the 1-year precrisis period. This period featured stable and relatively
low index compared to other periods, with just a few mild surges and averaged at 1713. For
comparison, the all-time average of search volume during noncrisis periods between 1 January
2011 and 15 October 2017 is 2773.95
According to the South China Sea Public Opinion Newsletter, a monthly newsletter that regularly
monitors public opinion on the South China Sea dispute, the ﬁrst half of 2014 shows low level of
public attention in social media, and almost all online discussions were exclusively about the
dispute with the Philippines or the US’ involvement.96 Given the weak public opinion and Beijing’s
moderate policy intent, a propaganda campaign to moderate public opinion is not needed, so
Beijing chose to stay quiet.
An alternative explanation: audience cost?
Was Hanoi trying to tie its own hands by stoking nationalism and to incur a domestic audience cost
as leverage to coerce Beijing to back down? Hanoi had coercive goals during the crisis. One of
these goals was to prevent the Chinese oil rig from drilling in the area and to force it to leave. As
argued earlier, Hanoi did make public threats, but these threats were vague and weak.
92The WITS incorporates data from the World Bank, the UNSD Commodity Trade (UN Comtrade) database, the WTO’s Integrated
Data Base (IDB) and others. There is only trivial diﬀerence between the WITS data and the GSOV data. No data source is cited
in the Malesky and Morris-Jung claim.
93Poh, ‘The Myth’, p. 153.
94Interview with Chinese journalists and editors, 29 May, 31 May 2017, 2017, and 1 June 2017, Beijing.
95BSI data is available between 1 January 2011 and 15 October 2017. The indices are not the actual number of daily searches
but an indicator that reﬂects the ‘relative’ level of search activity. The formulae are not transparent, but it takes in account
China’s increasing population of internet users, so these data are comparable over time and between diﬀerent keywords
searched. The authors excluded data during three crisis periods related to the South China Sea because the data during these
crises would puﬀ up the average. The excluded periods include 5/26–6/26/2011 during the Sino-Vietnamese cable cutting
incidents, 4/12–6/4/2012 during the Sino-Philippines Scarborough Shoal standoﬀ, and 6/1–8/1/2016 during the Sino-
Philippines arbitration crisis.
96Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies at Nanjing University, The South China Sea Public Opinion
Newsletter, January, February, March, and April 2014.
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Three questions remain to further evaluate the strength of an audience cost explanation. First, was the
nationalist expression organic or state-instigated? In other words, did Hanoi try to tie its own hands by
encouraging nationalist expressions and thus intentionally incurring an audience cost? Second, did Hanoi
use the strong nationalist sentiment as leverage in negotiations with Beijing? Third, did Beijing believe
that Hanoi was constrained domestically by its public? If Hanoi deliberately tied its hands by instigating
nationalism, then used it in coercing Beijing tomove the rig, and if Beijing believed that Hanoi was indeed
constrained by its domestic public, then an audience cost explanation would be strongly supported.
The answer to the ﬁrst question is a limited yes. Asmentioned earlier, Hanoi allowed and at times even
encouraged the public protests. But strong genuine public opinion had already existed before the crisis.
Hanoi only played a facilitating role in aiding the strong expressions of public sentiment, but not without
limits—once it got out of hand on 13 May, the government clamped down.
On the second question, the content of the conversations between the two countries’ leaders and
diplomatic representatives is not fully available to evaluate whether domestic public opinion was used as
leverage. But fromwhat is known, evidence is generally lacking to support the utility of the strong public
opinion to Hanoi’s position. If anything, the violent protests became more of a liability than leverage.
Beijing put the blame squarely on Hanoi in failing to prevent the riots. Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and
South Korea, whose factories were all targeted, expressed grave concerns for public safety. Investor
conﬁdence was also hurt. Vietnamese stocks tumbled. So it was highly unlikely that the strong public
opinion was ever used as leverage in coercing Beijing to retreat.
On the third question, Beijing had good reasons to be skeptical to the constraining power of
an audience cost to Hanoi. Sharing a similar regime type and common experiences dealing
with nationalistic publics, Beijing understood Hanoi had means to deescalate the rhetoric and
calm the public. Frames such as invoking the nation’s peaceful identity, the economic costs of
war, possible mediation by the UN, and the threat of economic sanctions have proven eﬀect in
reducing cost from backing down in a Chinese context.97 If Hanoi chose to, Beijing believed
that Hanoi had the same set of tools available to them. In fact, Beijing ridiculed Hanoi’s blunder
in fermenting extreme nationalist sentiment and causing it to backﬁre. A Global Times editorial
commented that Hanoi ‘does not know the danger of playing with extreme nationalism and
does not have the ability to control violence.’98 As it turned out, Hanoi was able to perform a
moderate foreign policy without much domestic constraint.
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Figure 1. Daily search volume of ‘South China Sea’ on Baidu.com During 5/2/2013–5/2/2014.
97Kai Quek and Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Can China back down? Crisis de-escalation in the shadow of popular opposition’,
International Security 42(3), (2018), pp. 7–36.
98‘社评: 越南打砸抢烧在世界面前丢人现眼’ [‘Editorial: The beating, smashing, looting, and burning shamed Vietnam in
front of the whole world’], Huanqiu Shibao, (16 May 2014), available at: http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2014-05/
4996625.html (accessed 1 February 2019).
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As the above reasoning suggests, although evidence cannot rule out the possibility of an
intention by Hanoi to incur a domestic audience cost to enhance its threat credibility against
China, the lack of a clear and resolute threat casts doubt on such a possibility. We will not know for
certain until documents on the internal Vietnamese deliberations become available. But it is certain
that Hanoi was not successful in incurring an audience cost or using it against China.
The audience cost explanation is also hard to square with Beijing’s behavior. Beijing also had
coercive goals in the crisis: to stop the Vietnamese interference in the oil rig’s exploration activities
and to prevent the Vietnamese ships from ramming the rig; to keep Hanoi from enlarging the
matter by resorting to international forums such as the UN or the ASEAN, pursuing legal means, or
appealing to the United States and other powers; to have Hanoi keep a lid on domestic nationalist
expressions and clamp down on the riots. But Beijing chose to forgo the opportunity of incurring
audience cost to buttress these coercions. The outcome of China’s media behavior contradicts an
audience cost prediction. This is due to the concern that a hardline public opinion would constrain
ﬂexibility for a moderate policy choice.
Beyond the crisis
CNOOC announced on 16 July 2014 that its drilling platform HYSY-981 had completed its exploration
‘smoothly and on schedule’ and it was withdrawing the rig.99 Clearly the venture had not been smooth,
and the rig was withdrawn a month before its scheduled completion. There have been as many
explanations for the early withdrawal as there were for the original placement, but subsequent actions
by both China and Vietnam have demonstrated their mutual interest in avoiding further crises.100 In late
August, a special envoy of CPV Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trongmade a brief but well publicized visit
to Beijing at the invitation of the CPC Central Committee. On the eve of the visit, Vietnam announced that
it would provide humanitarian assistance to workers injured in the riots, and China acknowledged the
gesture.101 Most of the workers evacuated by China returned.102 In October, China’s Minister of Defense
invited a high-level delegation of Vietnamese generals to Beijing to discuss crisis avoidance in the
future.103 In 2016, China and Vietnam conducted a joint exploration of marine mineral resources beyond
themouth of the Gulf of Tonkin, and in January 2017, the General Secretaries of the CPC and VCP issued a
joint statement on managing maritime diﬀerences.104
Since 2014, there have not been any crises in the Vietnam–China relationship comparable to the oil rig
crisis. Nevertheless, China’s increased construction in the South China Sea and its reaction to the
Permanent Court of Arbitration’s (PCA) ruling in favor of the Philippines shows that diﬀerences of interest
persist. The diplomatic challenge is how to prevent each country’s pursuit of conﬂicting interests from
escalating into mutually disadvantageous crises. The short-term solution is better communication. The
long-term solution is a region-wide commitment to a Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea. Over
99‘CNPC Finds Oil and Gas Shows in South China Sea’, Oﬀshore Energy Today, 16 July 2014, available at https://www.
oﬀshoreenergytoday.com/cnpc-ﬁnds-oil-and-gas-shows-in-south-china-sea/ (accessed 28 December 2018).
100Alexander Vuving, ‘Did China Blink in the South China Sea?’, National Interest, (27 July 2014), available at: https://
nationalinterest.org/feature/did-china-blink-the-south-china-sea-10956 (accessed 1 February 2019); Carl Thayer, ‘Vietnam,
China and the oil rig crisis: who blinked?’, National Interest, (4 August 2014), available at: https://thediplomat.com/2014/
08/vietnam-china-and-the-oil-rig-crisis-who-blinked/ (accessed 1 February 2019).
101‘Remarks by MOFA’s Spokeman Le Hai Binh on 25 August 2014’, available at: http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/
ns140825093826/view (accessed 28 December 2018).
102Shannon Tiezi, ‘Vietnam sends envoy on ice-breaking trip to China’, The Diplomat, 26 August 2014, available at: https://
thediplomat.com/2014/08/vietnam-sends-envoy-on-ice-breaking-trip-to-china/ (accessed 1 February 2019).
103Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Vietnam Send High-Level Military Delegation to China’, Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, (20 October
2014), available at: https://www.c3sindia.org/archives/vietnam-send-high-level-military-delegation-to-china/ (accessed 1
February 2019).
104‘外媒关注中越同意管控海上分歧’ [‘Foreign Media Pays Attention to China-Vietnam Agreement on Managing Maritime
Diﬀerences’], Huanqiu Shibao, 16 January 2017, available at: http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2017-01/9951078.html
(accessed 1 February 2019).
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the course of 2017, China and ASEAN agreed on a draft framework for a CoC, and they agreed on a
negotiating draft in June 2018.105
The CoC will not solve the problems of the South China Sea, and the maritime problems are
only a part of the picture. The draft framework is general and does not address the sore points of
the dispute.106 Nevertheless, general and apparently empty agreements among contending parties
can be important turning points in regional conﬂicts. The best example of an empty agreement
becoming a watershed was the Berlin Four Powers Agreement of 1971. The agreement ended the
phase of hostile confrontation begun by the Berlin Wall, opened possibilities of increased contact,
set the stage for the1973 Basic Treaty, and was a milestone in Cold War détente. And yet the
Agreement does not use the word ‘Berlin’ and left vague all contentious issues.107 Ironically, the
subsequent Basic Treaty, by recognizing two German states, allowed the international stand-down
regarding Germany that was a precondition to eventual German reuniﬁcation in 1989.
It is quite possible that in retrospect the oil rig crisis and the confrontation over the Permanent
Court of Arbitration’s (PCA) ruling for the Philippines will be seen as the high point of public
dispute regarding sovereignty in the South China Sea. The oil rig crisis showed the danger of
nationalist publics engaged in crises. With the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative in
2014, China’s bag of carrots has grown much larger. Meanwhile, the uncertainties that President
Trump has introduced into American foreign policy make the United States a questionable ally.108
A poll of Southeast Asian elites showed equal distrust of China and the United States.109 China’s
neighbors will try to buﬀer their exposure to China by developing their other relationships, but as
the center of East Asia’s geography, population, and production, China has much to oﬀer.
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